THE FLIGHTCREW REPORTED THAT THE TAKEOFF ROLL APPEARED TO BE NORMAL IN ALL
RESPECTS, WITH NO WARNING LIGHTS, AUDIBLE WARNINGS, OR UNUSUAL ENGINE INSTRUMENT
CONDITIONS. THE CAPTAIN STATED THAT THE ROTATION WAS INITIALLY NORMAL, BUT AS
THE MAIN GEAR WHEELS LEFT THE GROUND HE HEARD "TWO EXPLOSIONS." HE SAID IT FELT
AS THOUGH THE AIRPLANE WAS EXPERIENCING "REVERSE THRUST." THE CAPTAIN STATED
THAT THE AIRPLANE BEGAN TO "ROLL VIOLENTLY." THE AIRPLANE STRUCK THE INSTRUMENT
LANDING SYSTEM (ILS) LOCALIZER ANTENNA ARRAY APPROXIMATELY 1,000 FEET BEYOND THE
END OF RUNWAY 18L, AND CAME TO REST ABOUT 3,200 FEET BEYOND THE DEPARTURE END OF
THE RUNWAY. INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE WING FLAPS AND SLATS WERE NOT
PROPERLY CONFIGURED PRIOR TO THE ATTEMPTED TAKEOFF. (FOR FURTHER INFORMATION -
SEE NTSB/AAR-89/04.)
Probable Cause
(1) THE CAPTAIN AND FIRST OFFICER'S INADEQUATE COCKPIT DISCIPLINE WHICH RESULTED
IN THE FLIGHTCREW'S ATTEMPT TO TAKEOFF WITHOUT THE WING FLAPS AND SLATS PROPERLY
CONFIGURED; AND (2) THE FAILURE OF THE TAKEOFF CONFIGURATION WARNING SYSTEM TO
ALERT THE CREW THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT PROPERLY CONFIGURED FOR THE TAKEOFF.
CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS DELTA'S SLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF NECESSARY
MODIFICATIONS TO ITS OPERATING PROCEDURES, MANUAL'S, CHECKLISTS, TRAINING, AND
CREW CHECKING PROGRAMS WHICH WERE NECESSITATED BY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE
AIRLINE FOLLOWING RAPID GROWTH AND MERGER. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS
THE LACK OF SUFFICIENTLY AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY THE FAA TO HAVE KNOWN DEFICIENCIES
CORRECTED BY DELTA AND THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE FAA'S
AIR CARRIER INSPECTION PROCESS.