Date: January 23, 1982
Type: DC-10-30CF
Registration: N113WA
Operator: World Airways, Inc.
Where: Boston-Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts
Report No. NTSB-AAR-82-15
Report Date: December 15, 1982
Pages: 109

On January 23, 1982, World Airways, Inc., Flight 30H, a McDonnell Douglas 
DC-10-30, was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Oakland, 
California, to Boston, Massachusetts, with an en route stop at Newark, 
New Jersey. Following a nonprecision instrument approach to runway 15R at 
Boston-Logan International Airport, the airplane touched down about 2,500 
feet beyond the displaced threshold of the 9,191-foot usable part of the 
runway. About 1936:40, the airplane veered to avoid the approach light 
pier at the departure end of the runway and slid into the shallow water 
of Boston Harbor. The nose section separated from the forward fuselage in 
the impact after the airplane dropped from the shore embankment. Of the 
212 persons on board, two are missing and presumed dead.  The others 
evacuated the airplane safely, but with some injuries.

The weather was 800-foot overcast, 2 t/2-mile visibility, with light rain 
and fog. The temperature was 38! with the wind from 165! at 3 kns. The 
surface of runway 15R was covered with rain, hard-packed snow, and glaze 
ice. At 1736, 2 hours before the accident, runway braking was reported by 
a ground vehicle as "fair to poor;" subsequently, several pilots had 
reported braking as poor, and one pilot had reported braking as "poor to 
nil" in the hour before the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the pilot landed the airplane without 
sufficient information as to runway conditions on a slippery, ice-covered 
runway, the condition of which exceeded the airplane's stopping 
capability. The lack of adequate information with respect to the runway 
was due to the fact that (1) the FAA regulations did not provide guidance 
to airport management regarding the measurement of runway slipperiness 
under adverse conditions; (2) the FAA  regulations did not provide the 
flightcrew and other personnel with the means to correlate contaminated 
surfaces with airplane stopping distances; (3) the FAA regulations did 
not extend authorized minimum runway lengths to reflect reduced braking 
effectiveness on icy runways; (4) the Boston-Logan International Airport 
management failed to exercise maximum efforts to assess and improve the 
conditions of the ice-covered runways to assure continued safety of heavy 
jet airplane operations; and, (5) tower controllers failed to transmit 
available braking information to the pilot of Flight 30H.

Contributing to the accident was the failure of pilot reports on braking 
to convey the severity of the hazard to following pilots.

The pilot's decision to retain autothrottle speed control throughout the 
flare and the consequent extended touchdown point on the runway 
contributed to the severity of the accident.