THE AIRPLANE COLLIDED WITH TREES AND A PRIVATE RESIDENCE SHORTLY AFTER THE
FLIGHTCREW EXECUTED A MISSED APPROACH FROM THE RWY 18R ILS. FLIGHTCREW WAS NOT
PROVIDED UPDATED WX INFO IN ATIS;WX REFLECTED THUNDERSTORM & RAINSHOWER.
TERMINAL DOPPLER WX RADAR NOT INSTALLED AT ARPT AS SCHEDULED; WOULD HAVE
PROVIDED CONTROLLERS WITH INFO ABOUT SEVERITY OF WX, AND INFO WOULD HAVE BEEN
BENEFICIAL TO FLIGHTCREW. INADEQ ATC PROCEDURES, BREAKDOWN IN COMM IN TOWER,
PREVENTED FLIGHTCREW FROM RECEIVING ADDITIONAL CRITICAL INFO ABOUT ADVERSE WX
OVER ARPT & ALONG APPROACH PATH. FLIGHT ENCOUNTERED WINDSHEAR OF 61 KTS OVER A
15 SEC PERIOD. INADEQ COMPUTER SOFTWARE DESIGN IN THE AIRPLANE'S ON-BOARD
WINDSHEAR DETECTION SYSTEM PREVENTED FLIGHTCREW FROM RECEIVING MORE TIMELY
WINDSHEAR ALERT. 1ST OFFICER INITIALLY ROTATED TO PROPER 15 DEG NOSE-UP ATTITUDE
DURING MISSED APPROACH. HOWEVER, THRUST WAS SET BELOW STANDARD GO-AROUND EPR
LIMIT OF 1.93, PITCH ATTITUDE REDUCED TO 5 DEG NOSE DOWN BEFORE FLIGHTCREW
RECOGNIZED DANGEROUS SITUATION. FAA'S POI, USAIR'S MANAGEMENT, WERE AWARE OF
INCONSISTENCIES IN FLIGHTCREW ADHERENCE TO OPERATING PROCEDURES WITHIN THE
AIRLINE; HOWEVER, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HAD NOT RESOLVED THIS PROBLEM.
Probable Cause
1) THE FLIGHTCREW'S DECISION TO CONTINUE AN APPROACH INTO SEVERE CONVECTIVE
ACTIVITY THAT WAS CONDUCIVE TO A MICROBURST; 2) THE FLIGHTCREW'S FAILURE TO
RECOGNIZE A WINDSHEAR SITUATION IN A TIMELY MANNER; 3)THE FLIGHTCREW'S FAILURE
TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE PROPER AIRPLANE ATTITUDE AND THRUST SETTING
NECESSARY TO ESCAPE THE WINDSHEAR; AND 4) THE LACK OF REAL-TIME ADVERSE WEATHER
AND WINDSHEAR HAZARD INFORMATION DISSEMINATION FROM AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, ALL OF
WHICH LED TO AN ENCOUNTER WITH AND THE FAILURE TO ESCAPE FROM A
MICROBURST-INDUCED WINDSHEAR THAT WAS PRODUCED BY A RAPIDLY DEVELOPING
THUNDERSTORM LOCATED AT THE APPROACH END OF RUNWAY 18R. CONTRIBUTING TO THE
ACCIDENT WERE: 1) THE LACK OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES THAT WOULD HAVE
REQUIRED THE CONTROLLER TO DISPLAY AND ISSUE AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE RADAR (ASR-9)
WEATHER INFORMATION TO THE PILOTS OF FLIGHT 1016; 2) THE CHARLOTTE TOWER
SUPERVISOR'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY ADVISE AND ENSURE THAT ALL CONTROLLERS WERE
AWARE OF AND REPORTING THE REDUCTION IN VISIBILITY AND RUNWAY VISUAL RANGE VALUE
INFORMATION, AND THE LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR ALERTS THAT HAD OCCURRED IN MULTIPLE
QUADRANTS; 3) THE INADEQUATE REMEDIAL ACTIONS BY USAIR TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES; AND 4) THE INADEQUATE SOFTWARE LOGIC IN THE
AIRPLANE'S WINDSHEAR WARNING SYSTEM THAT DID NOT PROVIDE AN ALERT UPON ENTRY
INTO THE WINDSHEAR. (NTSB REPORT AAR-95/03)